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Introduction
Stabilization has become a buzzword in 
peacekeeping, with UN missions in such diverse 
environments as Haiti, the Central African 
Republic, and Mali all claiming it as their central 
goal. Few of these missions, however, seem to 
have a clear understanding of what the concept 
means in practice.1 The UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) appears to refer 
to stabilization as a transitory phase between 
all-out conflict and development, which in 
practice consists of support to military operations, 
rebuilding state institutions, and conducting socio-
economic recovery work to undermine the appeal 
of armed groups. Should it wish, DPKO could have 
an excellent test case in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) for its ideas on stabilization. 
It is here where the assumptions and activities of 
stabilization have been tested for longer than in 
any other peacekeeping environment—and where 
the UN’s difficulties in moving away from a focus 
on short-term, technical solutions have become 
clear.2 
The misuses of state-building
Even before it had the ‘S’ for stabilization in its 
title and was still known as MONUC, the Mission 
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation 
de la République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO, 
United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC) 
began coordinating stabilization activities. The 
first phase of the I4S was preceded by the creation 
of a small stabilization office in the office of the 
Eastern Coordinator, with a specific but modest 
set of stabilization goals on four main axes in the 
eastern provinces (2008–2009). A second phase 
(2009-2012) took shape along the preferred lines of 
Key points 
•	 The	revised	International	Security	and	
Stabilization	Support	Strategy	(I4S)	is	
perhaps	the	UN’s	first	coherent,	detailed	
approach	to	stabilization,	focusing	on	locally	
relevant	drivers	of	conflict.	
•	 Despite	the	strategy’s	appeal	to	donors,	
provincial	governments,	and	NGOs,	
there	has	been	little	evidence	that	the	
UN	peacekeeping	mission	in	the	DRC,	
MONUSCO,	is	engaging	with	it.	
•	 MONUSCO	is	institutionally	drawn	to	the	
presentation	of	joint	UN-Congolese	military	
operations,	as	well	as	the	expansion	of	
the	Congolese	state,	as	contributions	to	
stabilization,	despite	the	limited	effect	this	
has	had	in	the	past.
•	 Insecurity	is	meanwhile	rife	in	the	eastern	
provinces,	while	high-profile	initiatives	such	
as	the	Force	Intervention	Brigade	(FIB)	have	
lost	momentum.
•	 The	time	may	therefore	be	ripe	for	
MONUSCO	to	embrace	the	I4S	but,	
regardless	of	MONUSCO’s	stance,	its	
partners	should	push	ahead	with	this	
framework.
I4S	police	housing	project	in	Bitale,	South	Kivu,	2014.
2 RIFT	VALLEY	INSTITUTE	PSRP	BRIEFING	8	•	FEBRUARY	2016
the DRC government and MONUC. The strategy 
of supporting military operations and the filling 
of supposed state vacuums aimed to diminish 
conflict. This was to be achieved by rehabilitating 
hundreds of kilometres of roads, constructing 
dozens of state structures, and training thousands 
of administrative and police officials, on top of 
economic recovery programmes for almost half a 
million people, in order to provide alternatives to 
those joining armed groups. A USD 367 million 
project portfolio was thus implemented by UN 
agencies and NGOs but the strategy did not have 
the intended results.3 New roads and buildings 
led to new types of predatory behaviour by 
state agents, and training had little impact on 
behavioural change. Development programmes 
that did not specifically target local tensions had 
little effect. Also, the first phase of the I4S was not 
clear about its theory of change. How could a one-
size-fits-all process of restoring state institutions 
prevent conflicts based on the nature of that state, 
as well as on localized issues of access to land, 
identity, and customary authority? The government 
in Kinshasa, moreover, had fundamentally different 
assumptions about the I4S from its international 
partners. To the Congolese government, 
stabilization was also a process of expanding 
its grip on sources of political and economic 
patronage.4 As a consequence, the preconditions 
for stabilization to work, such as political dialogue 
with local communities, working against impunity, 
and reforming the security sector, were barely 
addressed. 
The years 2009–2012 were some of the bloodiest 
years in Congolese history since the Second 
Congo War (1998–2003), culminating in the fall of 
Goma to the M23 rebel movement in November 
2012. This turbulence was a clear indication 
that previous efforts at stabilization focusing on 
technocratic state-building had been an inadequate 
response to deeply political problems.
A diversified approach to stabilization
In reaction, the Security Council requested a 
revision of I4S . A lengthy and participatory 
process ensued, led by MONUSCO’s Stabilization 
Support Unit (SSU) and drawing in government 
officials, UN partners, and civil society. Between 
2012 and 2015, the strategy was substantially 
revised and more or less turned on its head. The 
top-down approach for restoring the state was 
replaced by a new focus on locally relevant drivers 
of conflicts over power, land and identity, and on 
relations between communities and the state.5 At 
its core, the revised I4S was not just a programme 
framework, but a frank attempt to fundamentally 
change the way the international community was 
working in the Congo. The strategy recognized that 
national-level engagement was required to really 
stabilize the country, but suggested an approach 
that could have effect at the local level, even if 
this engagement did not materialize nationally. 
Stabilization was defined as a process where state 
and society build reciprocal accountability and 
address locally specific causes of violent conflict. 
A series of assessments was undertaken of the 
various conflict systems across the east and on 
the basis of this, programme priorities were 
established with the provincial governments. 
Community dialogue became the cornerstone 
of this strategy, allowing activities to be based 
on local understandings of what was creating 
violence. This led to a more diversified approach 
to stabilization. For example, security activities 
would focus on building rapport between locally 
deployed soldiers and communities, patrolling 
on the basis of jointly identified priorities—and 
higher-level authorities would support a clearer 
division of labour between the local administration 
and customary leaders.
The I4S also positioned itself as a support 
framework for the various other processes 
MONUSCO was involved in: ‘holding and building’ 
after ‘clearing’ operations; community security 
as a second track of security sector reform (SSR); 
and community-driven reintegration projects 
under a new disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration (DDR) programme for ex-
combatants. Donors financed some USD 50 million 
worth of new projects for dialogue and socio-
economic recovery under the new I4S, so that 
provincial governments which had been closely 
involved in setting priorities reportedly felt more 
empowered.6 International NGOs, which used to 
be quite critical of the original I4S, also supported 
the revised strategy. All the ingredients seemed in 
place for MONUSCO to make a major contribution 
to stabilizing the eastern DRC. However, events 
took a different turn.
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MONUSCO’s limitations
Between late 2012 and 2015, MONUSCO seems to 
have gone in various directions, committing only 
half-heartedly to the new stabilization strategy, 
while pursuing various other policies that it 
defined as contributing to stabilization. However, it 
remained unclear how these other policies related 
to the revised I4S, and what end results they were 
seeking.
The much-debated FIB, which was deployed to 
support the Congolese army in offensive operations 
against rebel forces, eclipsed nearly everything 
else the mission was doing. The brigade was 
presented not only as a new form of robust peace 
enforcement, but judging by the discussions in the 
Security Council at the time, also as MONUSCO’s 
approach to stabilization, in line with the military 
origins of the concept.7 In retrospect, the FIB was 
perhaps not the game changer it was intended 
to be—its momentum significantly diminished 
after the defeat of the M23—but it did act as a 
distraction from in-depth discussions on the 
political state of play in the eastern DRC, including 
the lessons learned from the I4S.8
During the same period, MONUSCO also started 
discussing several stabilization-like concepts it 
might use from other conflict settings, rather 
than from the I4S, albeit most of these seemed 
like simplified versions of the first phase of that 
strategy. The first concept was that of the Justice 
and Security Hubs. This idea originated in Liberia, 
where the UN mission supported the construction 
of geographically concentrated state structures 
and the training of state personnel. The notable 
difference between the first phase of the I4S and 
the Hubs, however, was that the Liberian state 
provided support to the deployment of staff and 
the payment of their salaries, which the Congolese 
government had consistently failed to do.
The second concept was Community Violence 
Reduction, or CVR. The UN mission in Haiti had 
piloted CVR in the slums of Port-au-Prince where 
manual labour projects for unemployed youths 
were combined with police activities. How this 
concept was going to be used in the DRC wasn’t 
entirely clear. CVR had been piloted in an urban 
setting and was focused on youth gangs—a very 
different context from that of the eastern DRC. 
Moreover, the first phase of the I4S had already 
shown that development activities that were not 
linked to local political dynamics had little effect on 
diminishing conflict.
The third concept, which the MONUSCO 
leadership decided to publicly invest itself in, was 
that of the Islands of Stability. The concept drew 
sustained criticism from NGOs.9 It was never made 
clear whether the Islands were a methodology or 
a supposed end-state. In practice, MONUSCO 
deployed staff in areas cleared through joint 
military operations with the Congolese army to 
accompany returning authorities, and provided 
funds for quick impact projects to rehabilitate 
roads and buildings, and undertake manual labour 
works. The Islands were referred to as a first step 
towards the I4S, but in reality the choice of Islands 
was based on military imperatives relating to the 
joint operations, rather than on addressing local 
drivers of conflict in a comprehensive manner. 
Furthermore, the policy focused on urban centres 
rather than on wider conflicts, and its build-and-
train approach had already been tried by the I4S on 
a much larger scale and found to be wanting.10
The FIB, the Hubs, CVR, and the Islands of 
Stability reveal much about the mission’s 
assumptions with regard to stabilization. To 
MONUSCO, the concept seemed to be a catch-
all term: ‘If it helps, it stabilizes.’11 At times, 
in mission reports between 2012 and 2015, 
stabilization was a heading under which issues 
as diverse as SSR, DDR, child protection and 
even elections were mentioned.12 One of the few 
times the concept was discussed openly was by 
mission chief Martin Kobler who, at the end of his 
mandate, claimed that he had always had an issue 
with the ‘S’ in MONUSCO as to him, stabilization 
meant a minimalistic return to a calm but negative 
status quo. In his view, this type of stability had 
already been achieved by 2015 due to MONUSCO’s 
presence in the field. The mission should go 
further by supporting state institutions and 
economic development, particularly around urban 
centres such as Goma.13 However, aside from being 
a perhaps too positive assessment of the state of 
the eastern provinces by 2015, Kobler’s ambitions 
did not entirely match what MONUSCO continued 
to do in practice.
Looking at MONUSCO’s actual activities, the 
mission’s core stabilization tasks continued to 
consist of supporting military operations and the 
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strengthening of state authorities. This was visible 
in the Hubs, CVR and the Islands of Stability 
as well. All three of these proposed approaches 
emphasized the rehabilitation of roads and 
buildings, and training and accompaniment to 
expand the presence of the state in the countryside. 
Despite critical lessons learned over the last years, 
it seemed that the expansion of state authority 
was still supposed to solve conflict at the local 
level. This assumption fitted in well with the 
peacekeeping mission’s traditional capacities. 
Thus, rather than formulating a strategy based 
on local needs, the process was reverse. A 
strategy was developed out of what the mission 
was traditionally mandated to do—and was 
subsequently labelled ‘stabilization’—making 
it a largely supply-driven process. The constant 
pressure that the mission faced from the Congolese 
government and the Security Council to deliver 
quick and visible results could only reinforce 
this tendency. Once the M23 had been defeated, 
the national government became less and less 
interested in working with the UN and began 
focusing on consolidating its power and preparing 
for the next elections. 
In such a context, the I4S posed questions about 
the very nature of peacekeeping activities and how 
to work with a predatory state, questions which 
were not easy for MONUSCO to answer. While 
military operations against prominent armed 
groups such as the Forces démocratiques de libération 
du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Liberation Forces 
of Rwanda) were on hold, and political processes 
such as SSR were making little headway, the 
mission had to be active on other fronts. This 
made activities such as the Islands of Stability all 
the more attractive, since they were visible, easily 
quantifiable and played to what the mission already 
knew how to do.14
Several observers have noted how MONUSCO 
has become a somewhat cynical mission over the 
last years, with little faith that it can change the 
status quo in the country. This is reflected in its 
institutional resistance to out-of-the-box thinking.15 
There has also been little external pressure on the 
mission to change. Firstly, the UN Security Council 
was mainly interested in broad political processes, 
such as regional diplomacy, elections, and the FIB. 
Secondly, I4S’s donors such as the UK, the US, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands only backed the 
revised stabilization strategy to a limited extent. 
Although they funded new programmes, they 
rarely engaged with the DPKO at a higher level to 
address MONUSCO’s way of operating. Finally, the 
I4S revision may have been too layered and detailed 
to gain immediate traction within the mission. 
Although the initial strategic approach was largely 
ready to be used even before the FIB deployed, 
the revision took a long time. Furthermore, many 
within MONUSCO, particularly its leadership and 
the Civil Affairs Section, considered the revised 
I4S to be too complex and too academic, although 
it encompassed USD 367 million of concrete, 
visible projects. Instead what they wanted was a 
straightforward programmatic approach that could 
help raise funds and quickly roll out activities. For 
these various reasons, the strategy was not seized 
upon as an organizing framework for mission 
activities and rarely mentioned in formal reports. 
Policy implications
At this time, the mission leadership seems to 
continue to accord the I4S relatively little priority, 
despite the fact that alternative strategies have 
yielded limited results. The context, however, is 
ripe for the mission to rethink its approach. The 
FIB has lost momentum, armed groups continue 
to proliferate and the Congolese government is 
demanding a serious downsizing of peacekeeping 
troops. Depending on whether relations between 
the government and the UN further deteriorate, 
MONUSCO may have to re-think how it will 
achieve locally relevant results without the 
engagement of the national government, and 
even start preparing an exit strategy. To do so, it 
could begin by following the recommendations 
of DPKO’s recent peacekeeping review, which 
suggests focusing on local political realities and 
area-based, people-focused peacebuilding. This 
could translate into putting its support behind the 
revised I4S, which takes these principles as a point 
of departure.16
However, MONUSCO may still see few 
institutional incentives to change its current 
policies. At the time of writing, the DPKO’s best 
practice section is drafting a critical report on 
lessons learned from the I4S and the Islands of 
Stability. While this may temporarily re-focus 
attention on stabilization, the 2016 elections will 
Credits 
This briefing was edited by Victoria Khroudina. Cover image © Hugo de Vries.
This document is an output from the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP), funded by the UK Aid from the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. However, the views expressed and information contained 
in it are not necessarily those of or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no responsibility for such views or information or for any reliance 
placed on them. It is available for free download from www.riftvalley.net and www.politicalsettlements.org.
The Rift Valley Institute works in Eastern and Central Africa to bring local knowledge to bear on social, political and economic development.
Copyright © Rift Valley Institute 2016. This work is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
THE	EBB	AND	FLOW	OF	STABILIZATION	IN	THE	CONGO 5 
probably absorb most of the Security Council’s 
attention.
While MONUSCO is deciding what to do next 
in terms of stabilization, the I4S and its partners 
could try to move ahead themselves, implementing 
concrete, context-specific activities to address local 
tensions in close collaboration with the provincial 
authorities. This would allow MONUSCO SSU, 
as the I4S’s coordinator, to build momentum by 
incorporating the I4S’s current programmes into 
those of other national and international partners 
and fitting them into the new stabilization priority 
plans. When this process is underway, new 
programmes could be set up that are more directly 
in line with the I4S, thereby gradually pulling 
together a new body of innovative stabilization 
work. The SSU would remain the bridge between 
MONUSCO and the I4S, communicating ideas to 
processes such as the Islands of Stability and DDR. 
In the meantime, constant advocacy at the highest 
levels, particularly in New York, may lead to a more 
thoughtful grasp of the concept of stabilization. If 
it wants to take a new approach to stabilization, 
MONUSCO has a strategy ready to hand.
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